Introduction
Over the past two years, there has been a surge of interest in open source software development. Interest in this process, which involves software developers at many different locations and organizations sharing code to develop and refine software programs, has been spurred by three factors: The idea that the proprietary software social system-the system that says you are not allowed to share or change software-is unsocial, that it is unethical, that it is simply wrong may come as a surprise to some people. But what else can we say about a system based on dividing the public and keeping users helpless? [Stallman, 1999] The "utility function" Linux hackers is maximizing is not classically economic, but is the intangible of their own ego satisfaction and reputation among other hackers. [Parenthetical comment deleted] Voluntary cultures that work this way are actually not uncommon; one other in which I have long participated is science fiction fandom, which unlike hackerdom explicitly recognizes "egoboo" (the enhancement of one's reputation among other fans) [Raymond, 1999b] .
It is not initially clear how these claims relate to the traditional view of the innovative process in the economics literature. Why should thousands of top-notch programmers contribute freely to the provision of a public good? Any explanation based on altruism 1 only goes so far. While users in less developed countries undoubtedly benefit from access to free software, many beneficiaries are well-to-do individuals or Fortune 500 companies. Furthermore, altruism has not played a major role in other industries, so it would have to be explained why individuals in the software industry are more altruistic than others. This paper seeks to address this puzzle, by making a preliminary exploration of the economics of open source software. Reflecting the early stage of the field's development, we do not seek to develop new theoretical frameworks or to statistically analyze large samples. Rather, we focus on three "mini-cases" of particular projects:
Apache, Perl, and Sendmail. 2 We seek to draw some initial conclusions about the key economic patterns that underlie the open source development of software. We find that much can be explained by reference to economic frameworks. We highlight the extent to which frameworks of labor economics, and in particular the literature on "career concerns," can explain many of the features of open source projects.
At the same time, we acknowledge that aspects of the future of open source development process remain somewhat difficult to predict with "off-the-shelf" economic models. In the final section of this paper, we highlight a number of puzzles that the movement poses. It is our hope that this section will have itself an "open source" nature:
that it will stimulate research by other economic researchers as well.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the relationship with the earlier literature on
The open source development process is somewhat reminiscent of the type of "user-driven innovation" seen in many other industries.
Among other examples, Rosenberg's [1976] studies of the machine tool industry and von Hippel's [1988] of scientific instruments have highlighted the role that sophisticated users can play in accelerating technological progress. In many instances, solutions developed by particular users for individual problems have become more general solutions for wide classes of users. But as we shall argue below, certain aspects of the open source process-especially the extent to which contributors' work is recognized and rewarded-are quite distinct from earlier settings.
The Nature of Open Source Software
2 These are summarized in Darwall and Lerner [2000] .
While media attention to the phenomenon of open source software has been recent, the basic behaviors are much older in their origins. There has long been a tradition of sharing and cooperation in software development. But in recent years, both the scale and formalization of the activity have expanded dramatically with the widespread diffusion of the Internet.
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In the discussion below, we will highlight three distinct eras of cooperative software development.
The first era: early 1960s to the early 1980s.
Many of the key aspects of the computer operating systems and the Internet were Many of the cooperative development efforts in the 1970s focused on the development of an operating system that could run on multiple computer platforms. The most successful examples, the Unix operating system and the C language used for developing Unix applications, were originally developed at AT&T's Bell Laboratories. The software was then installed across institutions, being transferred freely or for a nominal charge.
Many of the sites where the software was installed made further innovations, which were in turn shared with others. The process of sharing code was greatly accelerated with the diffusion of Usenet, a computer network begun in 1979 to link together the Unix programming community. As the number of sites grew rapidly (e.g., from 3 in 1979 to 400 in 1982), the ability of programmers in university and corporate settings to rapidly share technologies was considerably enhanced.
These cooperative software development projects were undertaken on a highly informal basis. Typically no effort to delineate property rights or to restrict reuse of the software were made. This informality proved to be problematic in the early 1980s, when AT&T began enforcing its (purported) intellectual property rights related to Unix.
The second era: early 1980s to the early 1990s.
In response to these threats of litigation, the first efforts to formalize the ground rules behind the cooperative software development process emerged. This ushered in the second era of cooperative software development. The critical institution during this period was the Free Software Foundation, begun by Richard Stallman of the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory in 1983. The foundation sought to develop and disseminate a wide variety of software without cost.
One important innovation introduced by the Free Software Foundation was a formal licensing procedure that aimed to preclude the commercialization of cooperatively developed software. In exchange for being able to use and modify the GNU software (as it was known), users had to agree to make the source code freely available (or at a nominal cost). As part of the General Public License (GPL, also known as "copylefting"), the user had to also agree not to impose licensing restrictions on others.
Furthermore, all enhancements to the code-and even code that intermingled the cooperatively developed software with that developed separately-had to be licensed on the same terms. It is these contractual terms that distinguish open source software from shareware (where the binary files but not the underlying source code are made freely available, possibly for a trial period only) and public-domain software (where no restrictions are placed on subsequent users of the source code).
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This project, as well as contemporaneous efforts, also developed a number of important organizational features. In particular, these projects employed a model where contributions from many developers were accepted (and frequently publicly disseminated or posted). The right to modify the official version of the program, however, was confined to a smaller subset of individuals closely involved with the project, or in some cases, an individual leader. In some cases, the project's founder (or his designated successor) served as the leader; in others, leadership rotated between various key contributors.
The third era: early 1990s to today.
The widespread diffusion of Internet access in the early 1990s led to a dramatic acceleration of open source activity. [I]n every release cycle Microsoft always listens to its most ignorant customers. This is the key to dumbing down each release cycle of software for further assaulting the non-personal computing population. Linux and OS/2 developers, on the other hand, tend to listen to their smartest customers… The good that Microsoft does in bringing computers to non-users is outdone by the curse that they bring on experienced users [Nadeau, 1999] .
Certainly, the greatest diffusion of open source projects appears to be in settings where the end users are sophisticated, such as the Apache server installed by systems administrators. In these cases, users are apparently more willing to tolerate the lack of detailed documentation or easy-to-understand user interfaces in exchange for the cost savings and the possibility of modifying the source code themselves. In several projects, such as Sendmail, project administrators chose to abandon backward compatibility in the 6 Two main open source projects (GNOME and KDE) are meant to remedy Linux's handicap on the desktop (mouse and windows interfaces).
interests of preserving program simplicity. One of the rationales for this decision was that administrators using the Sendmail system were responsive to announcements that these changes would be taking place, and rapidly upgraded their systems. In a number of commercial software projects, it has been noted, these types of rapid responses are not as influence. These individuals believe that allowing proprietary code and for-profit activities in segments that would otherwise be poorly served by the open-source community will provide the movement with its best chance for success.
The Origins of the Three Programs
Each of the three case studies was developed through the review of printed materials and interviews (as well as those posted on various web sites) and face-to-face meetings with one or more key participants in the development effort. In addition, we held a number of conversations with knowledgeable observers of the open source movement. In
Sections 4 and 5, we will frequently draw on examples from the three cases.
Nonetheless, we felt it would be helpful to first provide a brief overview of the three development projects.
Apache.
The development of Apache began in 1994. Brian Behlendorf, then 21, had the responsibility for operating one of the first commercial Internet servers in the country, that powering Wired magazine's HotWired web site. This server, like most others in the country, was at the time running the Unix-based software written at the National Center for Supercomputer Applications (NCSA) at the University of Illinois. (The only competitive product at the time was the server developed at the joint European particle physics research facility CERN.) The NCSA had distributed its source code freely and had a development group actively involved in refining the code in consultation with the pioneering users. As Behlendorf and other users wrote emendations, or "patches," for the NCSA server, they would post them as well to mailing lists of individuals interested in Internet technology.
Behlendorf and a number of other users, however, encountered increasing frustrations in getting the NCSA staff to respond to their suggestions. (During this time, a number of the NCSA staff had departed to begin Netscape, and the University was in the process of negotiating a series of licenses of its software with commercial companies.) As a result, he and six other pioneering developers decided to establish a mailing list to collect and integrate the patches to the NCSA server software. They agreed that the process would be a collegial one. While a large number of individuals would be able to suggest changes, only a smaller set would be able to actually make changes to the physical code.
In August 1995, the group released Apache 0.8, which represented a substantial departure from earlier approaches. A particular area of revision was the Application Program Interface (API), which allowed the development of Apache features to be very "modular." This step enabled programmers to make contributions to particular areas without affecting other aspects of the programs. 
Perl.
Perl, or the Practical Extraction and Reporting Language, was created by Larry Wall in 1987. Wall, a programmer with Burroughs (a computer mainframe manufacturer now part of Unisys) had already written a number of widely adopted software programs.
These included a program for reading postings on on-line newsgroups and a program that enabled users to readily update old source code with new patches.
The specific genesis of Perl was the large number of repetitive system administration tasks that Wall was asked to undertake while at Burroughs. In particular, Wall was required to synchronize and generate reports on two Unix-based computers as part of a project that Burroughs was undertaking for the U.S. National Security Agency. He realized that there was a need for a program language that was somewhere between the Unix shell language and the C language (suitable for developing complex programming applications). The Perl language sought to enable programmers to rapidly undertake a wide variety of system administration tasks. The program was first introduced in 1987 via the Internet. It has become widely accepted as a language for developing scripts for Apache web servers, and is incorporated in a number of other programs.
Perl is administered on a rotating basis: the ten to twenty programmers ( While he is no longer actively contributing to the programming, he remains active in managing the project.
Two efforts to establish a Perl-related foundation have foundered. The Perl Institute had been intended to ensure that less glamorous tasks, such as documentation, were undertaken, in order to enhance the long-run growth of Perl. The failure of these efforts may have reflected more about the specifics of the individual personalities involved than the prospects of the program itself.
Sendmail.
Sendmail was originally developed in the late 1970s by Eric Allman, a graduate student in computer science at the University of California at Berkeley. As part of his responsibilities, Allman worked on a variety of software development and system administration tasks at Berkeley.
One of the major challenges that Allman faced was the incompatibility of the two major computer networks on campus. The approximately one dozen Unix-based computers had been originally connected through "BerkNet," a locally developed program that provided continuous interconnection. These computers, in turn connected to those on other campuses through telephone lines, using the UUCP protocol (Unix-toUnix Copy Protocol). Finally, the Arpanet, the direct predecessor to the Internet, was introduced on the Berkeley campus around this time. Each of the networks used a different communications protocol: for instance, each person had multiple e-mail addresses, depending on the network from which the message was sent. To cope with this problem, Allman developed in 1979 a program called "Delivermail," which provided a way to greatly simplify the addressing problem. In an emendated form that allowed it to address a large number of domains, it was released two years later as "Sendmail."
Sendmail was soon adopted as the standard method of routing e-mail on the Arpanet.
As the network grew, however, its limitations became increasingly apparent. she derives a net benefit (broadly defined) from engaging in the activity. The net benefit is equal to the immediate payoff (current benefit minus current cost) plus the delayed payoff.
A programmer working on a software development project incurs a variety of immediate benefits and costs. First, the programmer receives monetary compensation if she is working for a commercial firm. Second, the programmer may be fixing a bug or customizing a program for her own benefit (as well as, in the case of an open source process, for the benefit of others.) Third, the programmer incurs an opportunity cost of her time. While she is working on this project, she is unable to engage in another programming activity. The actual cost of this time depends on how enjoyable the work is.
The delayed reward covers two distinct, although hard-to-distinguish, incentives. The career concern incentive refers to future job offers, shares in commercial open sourcebased companies, 9 or future access to the venture capital market. The ego gratification incentive stems from a desire for peer recognition. Probably most programmers respond to both incentives. There are some differences between the two. The programmer mainly preoccupied by peer recognition may shun future monetary rewards, and may also want to signal her talent to a slightly different audience than those motivated by career concerns. From an economic perspective, however, the incentives are similar in most respects. We will group the career concern incentive and the ego gratification incentive under a single heading: the signaling incentive.
Economic theory [e.g., Holmström, 1999] suggests that this signaling incentive is stronger, a) the more visible the performance to the relevant audience (peers, labor market, venture capital community), b) the higher the impact of effort on performance, and c) the more informative the performance about talent.
The first condition gives rise to what economists call "strategic complementarities."
To have an "audience," programmers will want to work on software projects that will attract a large number of other programmers. This suggests the possibility of multiple equilibria. The same project may attract few programmers because programmers expect that other programmers will not be interested; or it may flourish as programmers (rationally) have faith in the project.
The same point applies to forking in a given open source project. Open source processes are in this respect quite similar to academic research. The latter is well known to exhibit fads. Fields are completely neglected for years, while others with apparently no superior intrinsic interest attract large numbers of researchers. Fads in academia are frowned upon for their inefficient impact on the allocation of research. It should not be ignored, however, that fads also have benefits. A fad can create a strong signaling incentive: researchers working in a popular area may be highly motivated to produce a high-quality work, since they can be confident that a large audience will examine their work.
Comparison between open source and closed source programming incentives.
To compare programmers' incentives in the open source and proprietary settings, we need to examine how the fundamental features of the two environments shape the incentives just reviewed. We will first consider the relative short-term rewards, and then turn to the deferred compensation.
Commercial projects have an edge on the current-compensation dimension because the proprietary nature of the code generates income. This makes it privately worthwhile for private companies to offer salaries.
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This contention is the old argument in economics that the prospect of profit encourages investment, which is used, for instance, to justify the awarding of patents to encourage invention.
By way of contrast, an open source project may well lower the cost for the programmer, for two reasons:
i) "Alumni effect": Because the code is freely available to all, it can be used in schools and universities for learning purposes; so it is already familiar to programmers. This reduces their cost of programming for UNIX, for example. what the contribution of each individual was and whether that component "worked," but also whether the task was hard, if the problem was addressed in a clever way, whether the code can be useful for other programming tasks in the future, and so forth.
ii) Full initiative:
The open source programmer is her own boss and takes full responsibility for the success of a subproject. In a hierarchical commercial firm, however, the programmer's performance depends on her supervisor's interference, advice, etc. Economic theory would predict that the programmer's performance is more precisely measured in the former case. Johnson [1999] builds a model of open source production by a community of user-developers. There is one software program or module to be developed, which is a public good for the potential developers. Each of the potential developers has a private cost of working on the project and a private value of using it; both of which are private information. Johnson shows that the probability that the innovation is made need not increase with the number of developers, as free-riding is stronger when the number of potential developers increases. 13 An argument often heard in the open source community is that people participate in open source projects because programming is fun and because they want to be "part of a team." While this argument may contain a grain of truth, it is puzzling as it stands; for, it is not clear why programmers who are part of a commercial team could not enjoy the same intellectual challenges and the same team interaction as those engaged in open source development. The argument may reflect the ability of programmers to use participation in open source projects to overcome labor market rigidities that make signaling in other ways problematic.
As to the tasks that may appeal to the open source community, one would expect that tasks such as those related to the operating systems and programming languages, whose natural audience is the community of programmers, would give rise to strong signaling incentives. By way of contrast, tasks aiming at helping the much-less-sophisticated end user-e.g., documentation, design of easy-to-use interfaces, technical support, and insuring backward compatibility-usually provide lower signaling incentives. 
Evidence on individual incentives.
A considerable amount of evidence is consistent with an economic perspective.
First, user benefits are key to a number of open source projects. One of the origins of the free software movement was Stallman's inability to improve a printer program because Xerox refused to release the source code. In each of the three scenarios described in section 3, the project founders were motivated by information technology problems that they had encountered in their day-to-day work. For instance, in the case of Apache, the initial set of contributors was almost entirely system administrators who were struggling with the same types of problems as Behlendorf. In each case, the initial release was "runnable and testable": it provided a potential, even if imperfect, solution to a problem that was vexing considerable numbers of data processing professionals. The Apache project provides a good illustration of these observations. The project makes a point of recognizing all contributors on its web site, even those who simply identify a problem without proposing a solution. Similarly, the organization highlights its most committed contributors, who have the ultimate control over the project's evolution.
Moreover, it appears that many of the skilled Apache programmers have benefited 
Leadership, organization and governance.
A successful open source project also requires a credible leader or leadership, and an organization consistent with the nature of the process.
Although the leader is often at the origin a user who attempts to solve a particular program, the leader over time performs less and less programming. The leader must (a) provide a vision, (b) make sure that the overall project is divided into much smaller and well-defined tasks ("modules") that individuals can tackle independently from other tasks, (c) attract other programmers, and, last but not least, (d) "keep the project together"
(prevent it from forking or being abandoned).
The initial leader must assemble a critical mass of code to which the programming community can react. Enough work must be done to show that the project is doable and has merit. At the same time, to attract additional programmers, it may be important that the leader does not perform too much of the job on his own and leaves challenging programming problems to others.
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Indeed, programmers will initially be reluctant to join a project whose leadership qualities are yet untested unless they identify an exciting challenge. Another reason why programmers are easier to attract at an early stage is that, if successful, the project will keep attracting a large number of programmers in the future, making early contributions very visible.
Consistent with this argument, it is interesting to note that each of the three cases described above appeared to pose challenging programming problems. When the initial release of each of these open source programs was made, considerable programming problems were unresolved. The promise that the project was not near a "dead end," but rather would continue to attract ongoing participation from programmers in the years to come, appears to be an important aspect of its appeal. In this respect, Linux is perhaps the quintessential example. The initial Linux operating system was quite minimal, on the order of a few tens of thousands of lines of code. In Torvalds' initial postings in which he sought to generate interest in Linux, he explicitly highlighted the extent to which the version would require creative programming in order to achieve full functionality. acceptance by the leadership of a modification or addition provides some certification as to the quality of the latter and its integration/compatibility with the overall project.
As discussed by Max Weber [1968] , some attributes underlie a successful leadership.
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First, the programmers must trust the leadership: that is, they must believe that the leader's objectives are sufficiently congruent with theirs and not polluted by ego-driven, commercial, or political biases. For instance, the leadership must be willing to accept improvements on their merits even though they do not fit the leader's original blueprint.
Trust in the leadership is also key to the prevention of forking. While there are natural forces against forking (the loss of economies of scale due to the creation of smaller communities, the hesitations of programmers in complementary segments to port to multiple versions, and the stigma attached to the existence of a conflict), other factors may encourage forking. User-developers may have conflicting interests as to the evolution of the technology. Ego (signaling) concerns may also prevent a faction from admitting that another approach is more promising, or simply from accepting that it may 16 See also Hermalin [1998] .
socially be preferable to have one group join the other's efforts even if no clear winner has emerged. The presence of a charismatic (i.e., trusted) leader is likely to substantially reduce the probability of forking in two ways. First, indecisive programmers are likely to rally behind the leadership's preferred alternative. Second, the dissenting faction may not have an obvious leader of its own.
A good leadership should also clearly communicate its goals and evaluation procedures. Indeed, the open source organizations go to considerable efforts to make the nature of their decision making process transparent: the process by which the operating committee reviews new software proposals is frequently posted and all postings archived. 
Why don't corporations duplicate the open source incentives?
As we already noted, owners of proprietary code are not able to enjoy the benefits of getting free programmer training in schools and universities (the alumni effect); nor can they easily allow users to modify their code and customize it without jeopardizing intellectual property rights. Similarly, and for the reasons developed in section 4, commercial companies will never be able to duplicate the visibility of performance
reached in the open source world.
In contrast, they can to some extent duplicate some of the signaling incentives of the open source world. Indeed, a number of commercial software companies (e.g., video game companies, Qualcomm for the Eudora email program) list people who have developed the software. It is an interesting question why others do not. To be certain, commercial companies do not like their key employees to become highly visible, lest they be hired away by competitors. source [Valloppillil, 1998 ] describes a number of pressures that limit the implementation of features of open source development within Microsoft. Most importantly, each software development group appears to be largely autonomous. Software routines developed by one group are not shared with others. In some instances, the groups seek to prevent being broken up by not documenting a large number of program features. These organizational attributes, the document suggests, lead to very complex and interdependent programs that do not lend themselves to development in a "compartmentalized" manner nor to widespread sharing of source code. software. This is similar to the strategy of giving away the razor (the released code) to sell more razor blades (the related consulting services that HP will provide). First, the open source project may be "hijacked" by a participant who builds a valuable module and then offers proprietary APIs to which application developers start writing.
The innovator has then built a platform that appropriates some of the benefits of the project. To be certain, open source participants might then be outraged, but it is unclear whether this would suffice to prevent the hijacking. The open source community would then be as powerless as the commercial owner of a platform above which a "middleware" producer superimposes a new platform.
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Second, the coexistence of commercial activities may alter the programmers' incentives. To understand why it may be useful to make an analogy with academia (despite some differences between the academic research and open source development processes).
To put our reflections in perspective, let us first argue against the view that one should prevent academic research from being polluted by outside activities. We believe that these outside activities-e.g., for an economist, work with firms and financial 24 See, for example, the discussion of SGI's open source strategy in Taschek [1999] . 25 The increasing number of software patents being granted by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office provide another avenue through which such a "hijacking" might occur. In a number of cases, industry observers have alleged that patent examiners-not being very familiar with the unpatented "prior art" of earlier software code-have granted unreasonably broad patents, in some cases giving the applicant rights to software that was originally developed through open source processes.
intermediaries and participation in the public policy process; for an engineer, consulting with large firms and part-time work in start-ups-provides a useful two-way transfer of knowledge between practical matters and fundamental research. They also provide academics who desire it with (instantaneous and intertemporal) job diversification and thereby increase the attractiveness of academia. Yet, like many researchers, we are concerned that these outside activities may pollute the research process and make it less attractive. There are several reasons for this.
First, a field may be deprived of some of its best minds if they neglect fundamental research and pursue applied, specific-purpose projects rather than broader, generalpurpose innovations. The field may lose some of its allure as an exciting intellectual environment in which new insights accrue at a rapid pace and a large community that avidly reads about the latest developments.
Second, the academic process may lose some of its integrity. The high-powered incentives provided by outside activities may induce researchers to sell off some of the long-term reputational capital in the academic community. This happens for instance when a researcher puts his intellectual weight behind a dubious idea, directs students excessively to his or her start-up or consulting firm, rejects papers submitted to scientific journals simply because they do not mesh with the views espoused in the outside activity, or stops freely exchanging knowledge. To be certain, some of these behaviors are already motivated by purely academic incentives. Our point is simply that these may be exacerbated by the presence of powerful outside incentives, and by the shortening of the relationships that results from the move of academics to other communities. contributions to a Linux development site by Dempsey, et al. [1999] , who conclude that developers of more than two Linux applications, while accounting for only 9% of the overall sample, account for over 38% of the total contributions. If large numbers of lowquality contributions are becoming increasingly common, there may be substantial management challenges in the future.
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In this setting, sorting though the large number of software submissions of varying quality is likely to be an increasingly onerous task, one that will swamp the efforts of a volunteer staff. One possibility is the model being 
